I compare the outcome when …rms semicollude on advertising to the outcome in the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model of informative advertising. I show that advertising is lower but prices and pro…ts are higher under semicollusion on advertising. I also show that semicollusion on advertising is detrimental to welfare. Although …rms earn higher pro…ts when colluding on advertising, fewer consumers are informed, and as a result, welfare is lower. Compared to semicollusion on price, semicollusion on advertising is not always less pro…table. Hence I lend theoretical support to empirical studies that …nd evidence of collusion on advertising rather than price.
Introduction
The importance of advertising as a competitive weapon in sellers'interactions has long been recognized. Typically, a …rm that advertises more can expect higher demand and hence higher revenues, other things being equal. In multi…rm industries, this possibility to steal customers from competitors often results in costly "advertising wars" as …rms try to regain lost market share. If, in addition, advertising conveys price information, such advertising wars inadvertently lead to lower prices -a double blow! Indeed, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , Christou and Vettas (2003) , among others, show that increased price advertising raises demand elasticity and thus lowers prices. Hence, excessive advertising may actually hurt …rms. Therefore, if …rms are sophisticated, they ought to realize the folly of unbridled price advertising. Yet, the analysis of price advertising has been framed exclusively in terms of fully noncooperative interaction. While in many countries price collusion is per se illegal (which may explain nonprice collusion), collusion This paper is a revised version of Chapter One of my dissertation. I thank Richard Friberg for valuable comments. I also thank Lars Sorgard, participants of the Lunch Workshop at Stockholm School of Economics and seminar participants at University of Cape Town for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from Vetenskapsrådet and the Wallander and Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
on advertising is not. 1 If anything, the existence of advertising agencies -that often handle advertising from several competing …rms -provides scope for collusion on advertising (Bernheim and Whinston, 1985) . 2 What is more, empirical evidence (on price and advertising strategies in di¤erent industries) seem to support the hypothesis of collusion on advertising. Gasmi et al (1992) investigate possible market con…gurations in the Cola market (Nash behaviour, Stackelberg leadership and several possible con…gurations of collusion). They use data for the period 1968-1986 to test their hypotheses and thus to select a model of strategic behavior that best …ts the data. Noncooperative behaviour in both advertising and prices is rejected by the data. They …nd support for collusion on advertising (but not price). In a similar study, but for the US butter and margarine industry, Wang et al (2004) reach a similar conclusion. A related study is that of the US cigarette market by Roberts and Samuelson (1988) . They …nd that, particularly for low tar cigarettes, the data does not seem to support the hypothesis of combative advertising. Moreover, they cannot reject the hypothesis of joint pro…t maximizing choice of advertising.
In this paper, I examine …rms'incentives to collude on advertising when advertising is purely informative. More precisely, I compare the equilibrium under collusion on advertising to the fully noncooperative equilibrium as well as to the equilibrium under price collusion. I also investigate the welfare implications of collusion on advertising.
I adopt the framework of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and postulate a linear city in which …rms sell a di¤erentiated product. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit interval and do not search. Firms advertise to inform consumers. I analyze three cases: no collusion, collusion on advertising only and collusion on price only. 3 I …nd that, compared to the noncooperative equilibrium outcome, collusion on advertising leads to reduced advertising but higher prices and pro…ts. By lowering the advertising intensity, collusion on advertising raises informational product di¤erentiation and this relaxes price competition. This allows the …rms to charge higher prices. Also, lower advertising has a positive direct e¤ect on pro…t -lower advertising outlay. The lower advertising outlay, coupled with the induced higher prices, enable …rms to earn higher pro…ts.
Although …rms earn higher pro…ts, semicollusion on advertising is bad for welfare. Consumers not only pay higher prices, rather, in addition to higher prices, fewer consumers get informed when …rms collude on advertising -and this exacerbates the loss of consumer surplus. In comparing price collusion to collusion on advertising, I …nd that the former dominates the latter in terms of revenues. Firms advertise more and charge higher prices 1 In the US, the pertinent case is California Dental Association (CDA) vs Federal Trade Commission (FTC). While the FTC and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals condemned the CDA's advertising restrictions as per se illegal, the US Supreme Court ruled that it was not "intuitively obvious" that the restrictions were anticompetitive. Instead, the Court instructed that the restrictions be examined (by the Ninth Circuit) under the rule of reason -where the potential bene…ts are contrasted to the costs (Lande and Marvel, 2000) . When a particular conduct is deemed per se illegal, the FTC /Court will move directly to the punishment phase. 2 In the US for example, promotion of milk products is cooperatively managed (Blisard, Undated ; Lande and Marvel, 2000) . 3 I deliberately omit the case of full collusion (collusion on both advertising and prices). It is well understood that the monopoly pro…t is at least as large as the sum of the duopoly pro…ts. Therefore, there is nothing much to be gleaned from studying this case. when colluding on price. However, price collusion is not, in general, more pro…table. This paper adds to the growing literature on semicollusion. Semicollusion obtains whenever economic agents choose to cooperate along some dimension(s) while at the same time competing along another dimension. The only previous work on semicollusion on advertising that I am aware of is Aluf and Shy (2001) . 4 They study comparison advertising in a duopoly market where products are, in the absence of advertising, homogeneous. In their model, advertising serves to di¤erentiate products in the eyes of the consumers (spurious product di¤erentiation). They show that semicollusion leads to higher advertising, prices and pro…ts relative to the noncooperative outcome.
In an interesting contribution, Fershtman and Gandal (1994) challenge the widely accepted view that price collusion is always bene…cial to …rms. They argue that semicollusion can be disadvantageous. In particular, they show that when …rms noncooperatively choose capacity in the …rst stage of the game and then collude on price in the second stage, they earn lower pro…ts compared to the fully noncooperative outcome. Steen and Sørgard (1999) adapt the Fershtman and Gandal (1994) model to suit the Norwegian cement market. In their model, …rms can also export excess output at the prevailing world price. They show that if each …rm's domestic market share is determined by the …rm's share of total industry capacity and …rms collude on price, a higher domestic demand may induce overinvestment in capacity and this in turn will lead to an increase in exports. They label this e¤ect the "semicollusion e¤ect". They empirically test for and …nd support for this e¤ect in the Norwegian cement cartel.
The paper closest to mine in scope is Aluf and Shy (2001) . However, in our framework, unlike Aluf and Shy (2001), advertising does not change consumers'tastes. That is, advertising is purely informative. I also di¤er with them in that I allow for semicollusion on price. This enables me to make comparisons between semicollusion on advertising and semicollusion on price.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the model. I derive the noncooperative and the semicollusive equilibria in section 3 and section 4 studies semicollusion on price. I contrast the equilibrium when …rms semicollude on price to the equilibrium when they semicollude on advertising in section 5. Section 6 discusses the pros and cons of semicollusion and section 7 concludes the paper.
Model and Preliminaries
I adopt Tirole (1988) 's model -a simpli…cation of the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model of informative advertising with di¤erentiated products. Two …rms, …rm 1 and …rm 2; sell a horizontally di¤erentiated good. The …rms are located at the end points of a linear city of unit length with …rm 1 located at point 0 and …rm 2 at point 1. Firms randomly send out advertisements (ads) to inform consumers of the prices they charge. That is, every consumer has an equal chance of receiving any ad that is sent by any …rm. Let i denote the advertising intensity of …rm i; i = 1; 2 (fraction of the consumer population that is exposed, at least once, to the advertising message of …rm i). The cost of reaching fraction i of consumers is denoted A ( i ) ; where A ( ) = a 2 =2; a > t=2: 5 Each good is produced at a constant marginal cost which I normalize to zero. There is no entry or exit. Consumers are uniformly distributed according to taste on [0,1], have unit demands and attach a dollar value of v to the consumption of a unit of the good. Consumers are uninformed about prices and …rm locations unless they are reached by advertising. Thus, uninformed consumers do not participate in the market. Informed consumers incur a shopping cost of t per unit of distance travelled. 6 Given the …rms'advertising intensities, 1 and 2 ; and the consumers'(passive) behavior, the market is delineated as follows; fraction 1 2 of consumers receive advertising messages from both …rms (fully informed); fraction i 1 j ; i; j = 1; 2; j 6 = i receive ads from …rm i but not …rm j (partially informed); and fraction (1 1 ) (1 2 ) receive no ads from either …rm (uninformed). I assume that 1 2 is large enough so that …rms …nd it worthwhile to compete for the fully informed consumers. 7 Fully informed consumers purchase from whichever …rm guarantees them the greatest surplus. A consumer located at x 2 (0; 1) gets surplus v p 1 tx buying from …rm 1 and surplus v p 2 t (1 x) buying from …rm 2. Let b
x denote the location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from …rm 1 and buying from …rm 2; then, b x = (p 2 p 1 + t) =2t: Consumers with locations x 2 [0; b x) buy from …rm 1 while those with locations x 2 (b x; 1] buy from …rm 2: Thus, …rm i faces the demand D i f ull = (p j p i + t) =2t from the fully informed consumers.
For partially informed consumers, demand is determined by individual rationality. Let x i denote the location of the consumer who receives advertising only from …rm i. Buying from …rm i yields surplus v p i tx i while the consumer gets surplus zero when not purchasing. Hence the demand from partially informed consumers is given by x i = v pi t : All partially informed consumers with locations less than x i …nd it worthwhile to purchase while those with locations greater than x i will not purchase. However, if v p i t; all consumers who receive at least one ad from …rm i will make a purchase, that is,
Thus, each …rm's demand is a sum of the demands by the partially informed and the fully informed consumers. That is;
In the sequel, I assume that the market is fully covered. For the market to be fully covered, it is necessary and su¢ cient that the partially informed consumer who travels the 5 I assume a > t=2 to allow for some consumers to be uninformed in equilibrium, so that it is possible to study the e¤ects of varying the advertising level. For a t=2; the advertising cost is too low and, as a result, we have full information in equilibrium. That is, 1 = 2 = 1: See also Tirole (1988; p. 292). 6 Since consumers are distributed according to taste, t can also be interpreted as the disutility from consuming a good that is di¤erent from the ideal. 7 A necessary condition for …rms to compete for the fully informed consumers is that advertising costs are low. In an appendix available from the author, I derive the exact conditions on the advertising cost, a: entire unit distance gets nonnegative surplus. That is, p + t v: 8 With this assumption, the demand facing …rm i reduces to:
3 Competition or Collusion?
In subsections 3.1 and 3.2 I derive, respectively, the noncooperative and the semicollusive equilibria and contrast them in subsection 3.3.
Noncooperative Equilibrium
Firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose both advertising levels and prices (Nash equilibrium). Firm i has the following maximization problem:
The …rst order necessary conditions are
Equation (4) equates the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of raising the advertising reach marginally.
Solving (3) for p at the symmetric equilibrium gives
It is immediate from (5) that higher advertising is associated with lower prices. This is explained by the fact that when the market is covered, fully informed consumers are price sensitive while partially informed consumers are not. A higher advertising intensity implies a higher proportion of fully informed consumers in the market and this puts pressure on prices. Substituting (5) back into the objective function yields,
as the …rm's pro…t for any given level of advertising. One can easily show that;
Lemma 1 Pro…ts are strictly decreasing in the advertising intensity.
Proof. @ =@ = ( 2) t a < 0: To understand why pro…ts decrease with advertising at all levels, we write the pro…t function as:
= R ( ) C ( ) ; where the revenue, R ( ) = 2t 2t + t 2 =2 and the cost, C ( ) = a 2 =2: Di¤erentiating the revenue and cost functions with respect to gives; R 0 ( ) = ( 2) t < 0 and respectively, C 0 ( ) = a > 0: That is, a small increase in advertising lowers the …rm's revenues but raises the …rm's costs. Although demand increases with advertising, the negative e¤ect on price of an increase in dominates the total e¤ect on revenues. Since revenues fall while costs rise with advertising, it follows that pro…t decreases with increases in advertising.
Solving (3) and (4) simultaneously gives;
and substituting (7) back into the objective function gives
where nc is a mnemonic for noncooperative.
Semicollusion
In this section, I study a two period game where …rms collude on advertising but compete on prices. The timing of the game is as follows: In the …rst stage, …rms noncooperatively set their prices, and in the second stage, knowing the equilibrium prices chosen in the …rst stage, they collusively decide on advertising. Our timing needs some dressing. Although the standard approach in the literature is to let …rms set the less ‡exible variable in the …rst stage and then set the more ‡exible choice variable (typically prices) in the second stage (see for example, Aluf and Shy, 2001; Salvanes et al, 2003), our timing is not without merit. In the case of print advertising, our timing is natural. When …rms advertise their prices, they need to know the prices before they can print them and send out the ‡iers. That is, …rms choose prices …rst.
To bring more realism to this game, we can recast the game as follows: …rms noncooperatively choose their prices while delegating the decision on advertising to a third party -the advertising agency. 9 In the …rst stage, …rms set prices and in the second stage, knowing the prices chosen by the …rms in the …rst period, the advertising agency chooses the advertising level to maximize …rms'joint pro…ts. 9 Bernheim and Whinston (1985) show that indeed the use of common marketing agents facilitates collusion. The role of advertising agencies include market analysis, media buying services, consultation on promotion strategies and techniques (design and packaging) among others (Printadvertising.com; Utah Firms Sta¤, 2003). Many …rms nowadays employ advertising agencies to do the advertising on their behalf. For example, EURO RSCG Worldwide has, among its clients, Volvo, Citroen and Peugeot -…rms competing in the same market! Catalpha Advertising and Design has among its clients; Black & Decker, DeWalt, Craftsman -…rms selling similar products.
Introducing an agency into the game potentially creates an agency problem. A question that arises is whether the advertising agency will have incentives to act in the interest of the …rms. However, it is not di¢ cult to see that, in the present setting, compensation (incentive) schemes can be easily designed to induce the agency to act in the joint interest of the …rms. For example, to align the agency and the …rms'incentives, one can imagine Nash bargaining over the total industry pro…ts between the agency and the …rms, or, the agency can be paid a commission (as in Bernheim and Whinston, 1985) that is a …xed proportion of each …rm's pro…t. Because higher advertising results in lower pro…t, in either case the agency will have incentives to reduce advertising. However, to simplify the analysis, I will assume that the advertising agency gets no share of the pro…ts.
As is typical in two stage games, I solve the problem backwards, starting with the collusive phase.
Collusion phase
In the collusive phase, the advertising agency sets 1 = 2 = ; knowing the equilibrium prices, p 1 and p 2 ; chosen by the …rms in the prior (noncooperative) phase. 10 The agency maximizes the following objective function:
The …rst order condition yields
Competition phase
In the competition phase, …rms noncooperatively set their prices, knowing that they will collude on advertising afterwards. Given the collusive advertising level in (10), …rm i's problem is described by:
Di¤erentiating with respect to p i ; and solving for a symmetric equilibrium gives:
Substituting (12) into (10) gives the semicollusive advertising level as:
Finally, substituting (12) and (13) into (9) gives the semicollusive pro…t as:
where ac is a mnemonic for collusion on advertising.
The full coverage assumption implies that p ac = t=2+ p 2at + t 2 =4 v t: For given t and v; simplifying gives a a
; where a is the highest advertising cost compatible with full market coverage.
Comparison
The question I seek to address here is the following: Does collusion on advertising and competition on price entail higher or lower prices; higher or lower advertising intensities; higher or lower pro…ts compared to the noncooperative outcome? Comparing equations (7) and (12), it is immediate that p ac > p nc : That is, equilibrium prices are higher under collusion on advertising. Also, from (7) and (13), I get (after a bit of algebraic manipulation) that ac < nc : Since higher advertising has a negative direct e¤ect on pro…t, collusion on advertising unambiguously raises pro…ts relative to the noncooperative outcome.
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The discussion following Lemma 1 gives a concise statement of why …rms may want to constrain informative advertising. The mechanism works as follows; Consumers who receive advertising from both …rms (fully informed) can make across …rm price comparisons and, as a result, they buy from the …rm quoting the lowest "delivered" price. Competition to sell to these consumers drives the price down. In contrast, consumers who receive advertising from a single …rm only (partially informed) are totally price insensitive (for all prices p v t). Hence, the optimal price applicable to this group is higher compared to that applicable to the fully informed group. Intuitively, because an increase in advertising raises the proportion of fully informed consumers in the market, it elevates the importance of the fully informed consumers and this puts pressure on prices and by Lemma 1, lowers pro…ts. The idea of collusion on advertising is precisely to try to minimize such competition by constraining the proportion of fully informed consumers. To summarize; Proposition 1 Collusion on advertising (and competition on price) gives lower equilibrium advertising but higher equilibrium prices and pro…ts relative to the fully noncooperative equilibrium. That is, ac < nc ; p ac > p nc and ac > nc :
Given that price …xing is per se illegal, the fact that it is possible to sustain higher prices and pro…ts without resorting to price …xing should be comforting for …rms. Collusion on advertising is di¢ cult to detect and /or prosecute (unlike price collusion). 12 As a matter of 1 1 More precisely, since ac < nc and @ @ < 0 (Lemma 1), it follows that ac > nc : 1 2 When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred that the CDA code of conduct was a "naked" restraint on price competition, the Commission thought they had nailed the CDA. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court instructed that the rules be examined under the rule of reason. Upon reconsideration, the fact, advertising agencies openly handle business on behalf of competing …rms (see footnote 9, see also Bernheim and Whinston, p. 269).
From a welfare perspective, an important question is whether semicollusion on advertising improves welfare. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , Hamilton (2004) and Simbanegavi (2005) show that the market may overprovide informative advertising relative to the socially optimal level. Hence collusion on advertising, by restricting advertising, is potentially welfare improving, especially for low advertising costs. On the one hand, when …rms collude on advertising, fewer consumers get informed and this lowers aggregate consumer surplus since uninformed consumers do not purchase. On the other hand, because prices are higher and because …rms advertise less when colluding on advertising, they earn higher pro…ts. So, which direction will the welfare e¤ect go? The following Proposition answers this question:
Proposition 2 Semicollusion on advertising is detrimental to welfare.
Intuitively, when …rms collude on advertising, they restrict advertising "too much". In fact, it can be shown that for all advertising costs in the relevant range, the collusive level is lower than the socially optimal level. That welfare in the semicollusive equilibrium is lower than in the Nash equilibrium is an important result, particularly for competition policy. Although …rms may overprovide informative advertising in the noncooperative equilibrium (particularly for low advertising costs), uncontrolled collusion is not a remedy. It is even more ine¢ cient. Under collusion on advertising, the collusive advertising level is "too low" and as a result, too few consumers are informed. This exacerbates the loss of consumer surplus. Since …rms have incentives to collude on advertising, there is clearly need for monitoring. 13 Although in the present model, just as in Aluf and Shy (2001), …rms charge higher prices and earn higher pro…ts when colluding on advertising, there are signi…cant di¤erences between the two models. First, in our framework, …rms advertise less when colluding. Second, the mechanism through which advertising a¤ects prices and pro…ts is di¤erent. In my model, advertising does not change consumers'tastes. Instead, it a¤ects informational product di¤erentiation and hence the toughness of price competition. That is, it alters the proportion of fully informed consumers in the market and hence the price elasticity of demand.
In what follows, I contrast price collusion to collusion on advertising. This is motivated by the fact that the analysis of semicollusion to date has largely been framed as collusion on price and competition on a nonprice variable. The question I address is the following: Does price collusion lead to higher pro…ts compared to nonprice collusion -in particular, to collusion on advertising? decision of the Ninth Circuit was least expected. The Court concluded that there was not enough evidence to show that the said restrictions were indeed anticompetitive (Lande and Marvel, 2000; pages 956-957). 1 3 This conclusion may not be very robust to variations in the models. For example, in a model in which TV channels sell advertising time to …rms, Kind et al (2005) …nd that when TV channels collude on advertising, equilibrium advertising levels are higher and the TV channels earn higher pro…ts than when they compete on advertising.
Price Collusion
For …rms with multiple strategic variables, semicollusion on price may trigger more competitive behaviour in other choice variables (Fershtman and Gandal, 1994) . I consider here a setting where …rms cooperatively set the price at which their merchandise will be sold. However, each …rm independently decides on the "measure" of ‡iers to send out to consumers. I derive the price collusion equilibrium and compare it to the advertising collusion equilibrium derived earlier.
As before, I model the …rms' behaviour as a two stage game. In the …rst stage, …rms collude on price and in the second stage, …rms compete on advertising.
When …rms collude on price, …rm i's demand is given by:
A peculiar feature of our model is that when …rms collude on price, demand is independent of price. This independence is a direct consequence of the full market coverage assumption. Because the market is fully covered, the demand by partially informed consumers is independent of price. Prices only matter for the partitioning of the fully informed segment of the market (see equation 1). Therefore, when …rms collude on price, they divide the fully informed consumer population equally between them -independent of the price.
I solve the problem backwards, starting with the second stage. Given the collusive price, p; chosen in the …rst stage, …rm i's second stage maximization program is given by:
Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to i and evaluating the …rst order condition gives
In the …rst period, anticipating competition on advertising in the second period, …rms collude on price. Given full market coverage, there is a unique focal price. Let p pc be the collusive price, where pc is a mnemonic for price collusion. Then:
Proof. I prove by contradiction. Let p pc be the pro…t maximizing collusive price and suppose p pc 6 = v t: Then, either p pc < v t or p pc > v t: First, suppose p pc < v t: Then (by continuity of price), 9" > 0 : p pc + " < v t and ( p pc + "; ) > ( p pc ; ) : Hence, any collusive price, p pc : p pc < v t cannot be pro…t maximizing -a contradiction. 14 Therefore, we must have p pc > v t: However, observe that p pc > v t violates the full market coverage assumption -a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that p pc = v t:
Given Lemma 2, evaluating (16) and (17) gives:
We see from (18) that price collusion gives rise to a full information equilibrium for lower levels of the advertising cost while it gives rise to a partial information equilibrium for higher levels of the advertising cost. Because the price is given (price is una¤ected by advertising), each …rm wants to inform as many consumers as possible (demand e¤ect). When a is small relative to price, it pays to inform all consumers. However, when a increases beyond v t 2 ; the advertising outlay becomes large relative to the revenues and the …rm responds by reducing the advertising intensity.
Collusion on Price or Advertising?
Below I relate the price collusion equilibrium to the advertising collusion equilibrium. The …rst result in this section comes from comparing the equilibrium prices and advertising intensities under the two collusive regimes. : Compared to semicollusion on advertising, the equilibrium price and advertising intensity are higher under semicollusion on price. That is, p ac < p pc and ac < pc :
Proof. By full market coverage, p + t v: Therefore from (12), we must have that p ac + t = t=2 + p 2at + t 2 =4 + t v: For given t and v; I can solve for a to get; a ; p ac = t=2 + p 2at + t 2 =4 < v t = p pc as required. The proof of the second claim (that ac < pc ) is given in Appendix A.
First, note that p pc = v t is the highest possible price consistent with full market coverage. Secondly, as I argued in Proposition 1, collusion on advertising is a "proxy" for collusion on price. Being an indirect way of colluding on price, it is sensible that p ac < p pc :
That ac < pc is intuitive. First, advertising is important in this model in that it raises demand. Hence, other things being equal, …rms always want to increase advertising. Second, when …rms collude on price, the negative relationship between price and advertising is broken. Clearly therefore, when …rms collude on price, they have greater incentives to advertise than when they collude on advertising. It follows therefore that price collusion induces more advertising. Since both the price and the advertising level are higher under price collusion, it follows immediately from Proposition 3 that:
Corollary 1 Revenues and advertising outlays are higher when …rms collude on price.
Proof. Let R denote revenues and D denote the demand. At equilibrium, A closer look at Propositions 1 and 3 brings to the fore an important di¤erence between price and nonprice collusion. Price collusion exacerbates competition on the variable that is chosen noncooperatively (see also Fershtman and Gandal, 1994 and Sørgard, 1999) . In contrast, nonprice collusion (collusion on advertising or capacity) does not intensify price competition. If anything, it relaxes price competition. In other words, the "semicollusion e¤ect" (the competition intensifying e¤ect of semicollusion) only kicks in under price collusion. To help explain this observation, I invoke Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)'s "taxonomy of business strategies".
As I have shown, when …rms collude on advertising, they advertise less. By voluntarily restricting its advertising, each …rm signals that it will not be aggressive in the price competition game. This is so because, with low advertising, fewer consumers are informed and with fewer informed consumers, demand is low. Hence pro…ts can only be enhanced by charging a higher (and not a lower) price. Because prices are strategic compliments, collusion on advertising softens the rival …rm's pricing behaviour 15 . In this sense, collusion on advertising is a "puppy dog" strategy. In contrast, collusion on price induces more aggressive behaviour in the advertising competition game. Because prices are …xed, the larger the demand that a …rm can generate, the higher the revenues it expects to get. However, since the price is …xed, demand can only be increased by informing more consumers -since uninformed consumers do not purchase. In this sense, price collusion makes each …rm tough in the advertising game 16 . In the animal jargon of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) , price collusion is a "top dog" strategy. The use of the animal terminology here needs to be quali…ed. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) use the animal jargon in a setting in which …rms move sequentially, with the …rst mover committing to a particular action, an action which is observed by the follower …rm prior to making its own move. In our setting however, …rms move simultaneously (rather than sequentially) at each stage, but still the commitment issue comes into play since …rms' second period choices will only be made after both …rms observe the …rst period choices. 17 From the present analysis, together with the analyses of Fershtman and Gandal (1994) and Steen and Sørgard (1999) , it appears that the semicollusion e¤ect can be explained by whether the collusion and competition instruments are strategic complements or substitutes. When …rms collude on a strategic substitute (advertising or capacity/quantity) and compete on a strategic compliment (price), competition is relaxed. However, when …rms collude on a strategic compliment (price) and compete on a strategic substitute (advertising or capacity/quantity), competition is exacerbated. I therefore conjecture that a necessary condition for the semicollusion e¤ect to kick in is that the competition variable is a strategic substitute.
The observation that price collusion intensi…es competition on the nonprice variable but not the other way round has important implications for …rm conduct. If …rms are "sophisticated" and have multiple choice variables, they ought to realize that price collusion is more likely to hurt them compared to nonprice collusion. Moreover, price collusion is per se illegal and is heavily punished for when discovered. This suggests then that …rms ought to shift focus from price to nonprice collusion. They seem to. There is an increasing number of nonprice collusion cases that the US Federal Trade Commission has had to deal with in recent years. Examples include; the California Dental Association case in which the association instituted rules and regulations that restrict price and quality advertising (FTC Docket No. 9259); the Arizona Automobile Dealers Association case in which the association agreed with some of its members to "restrain truthful and nondeceptive advertising" (FTC File No. 931 0056); collusion on advertising by PolyGram (predecessor to Vivendi Universal) and Warner in order to reduce intrabrand competition -competition between the Three Tenors' third album and video and the …rst and second albums and video (FTC File No. 001 0231; Goldberg, 2005) .
To recapitulate, the main question I address in this section is the following: If they had a choice, which strategic variable (price or advertising) would …rms use as the collusion instrument? To answer this question, I compare ac and pc : As a prelude, it is instructive to analyze the relationship between pro…ts and the advertising cost, a, under semicollusion on price and respectively, advertising. Di¤erentiating equations (14) and (18) with respect to a; I …nd that:
Lemma 3 Semicollusive pro…ts are decreasing (increasing) in the advertising cost under price (advertising) collusion.
Proof. See Appendix A. Under both collusion on price and collusion on advertising, the e¤ect of an increase in the advertising cost on pro…t can be decomposed into a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect. Notice that the advertising cost, a; enters directly into the advertising cost function but only enters into the revenue function indirectly -via price and /or advertising level (see equations (9) and (16)). The direct e¤ect of an increase in a is to raise the advertising outlay, other things being equal. However, other things will not remain equal. An increase in a induces …rms to reduce advertising and this increases informational product di¤erentiation -a strategic e¤ect.
Under collusion on advertising, this strategic e¤ect allows …rms to raise prices and consequently revenues. The e¤ect on revenues outweighs the direct e¤ect on the advertising outlay and hence pro…ts increase with the advertising cost.
Under semicollusion on price, there are two cases to consider. First, when a (v t) =2; we have full information (that is, pc = 1). Moreover, since p pc = v t; it follows that the revenue function is independent of a. Therefore, when a increases, the only component of the pro…t function that changes is the advertising outlay (which increases with a). Hence, for a (v t) =2; pro…t necessarily decreases with a: For a > (v t) =2; pc =
2(v t)
2a+v t < 1 and, when the advertising cost increases, …rms respond by advertising less. Although informational product di¤erentiation increases, prices cannot be increased and hence revenues must of necessity decrease. Since the direct e¤ect of an increase in a is to raise the advertising outlay, pro…ts fall when the advertising cost, a; increases.
Following Lemma 3, one may conjecture that there exists an a; (call it b a) for which the two pro…t functions intersect. If indeed such an a exits, then, for a < b a; semicollusion on price should yield higher pro…ts while for a > b a; semicollusion on advertising should yield higher pro…ts.
Let denote the ratio of transportation costs to the gross surplus, that is, t=v. Below I plot ac and pc as functions of a; for = 0:25: From Figure 1 , we see that for "low" values of a; ac (a) < pc (a) while the opposite is true for "high" values of a: In fact, it can be shown that, for a wide range of the parameter ; ac and pc intersect. Below I state the main result of this section;
Proposition 4 Semicollusion on price does not always lead to higher pro…ts compared to semicollusion on advertising. More precisely, let a 2 2 ;
(1 2 ) (1 ) 2 v and let b a a ( )
Proof. See Appendix A. Although price collusion dominates collusion on advertising in terms of revenues (Corollary 1), it is, in general, not superior to the latter. As was shown in Proposition 3, …rms advertise rather "excessively" when they collude on price (which increases demand and hence revenues). However, because the advertising cost function is convex, the …rms incur higher advertising costs under price collusion (bad for pro…ts). When the advertising cost is low, the revenue e¤ect dominates in the pro…t function and this makes price collusion more pro…table. However, for higher advertising costs, the revenue e¤ect is weakened by the ballooning advertising outlays. Because …rms advertise less when they collude on advertising, they incur lower advertising outlays. As a result, collusion on advertising yields higher profits compared to price collusion when the advertising cost is higher. In summary, collusion on price is not always more pro…table compared to collusion on advertising. Depending on parameter values, sometimes price collusion dominates and sometimes it is dominated.
A principal assumption of this paper is that equilibrium prices are such that the market is fully covered. One might wonder what the e¤ect of assuming full coverage is on pro…ts, particularly under semicollusion on price. As I have presented it, Proposition 4 is predicated on the assumption that the market is covered. However, it is quite reasonable to conjecture that when …rms collude on price, the optimal price may be such that some consumers …nd it pro…table not to purchase. If this is the case, then, by assuming full coverage, I restrict the collusive pro…ts under semicollusion on price, pc : Thus, it is imperative that I undertake a robustness check to see to what extent Proposition 4 depends on the full coverage assumption. I solve this exercise in Appendix B. I show that although indeed there exist some pro…table collusive prices for which the market will not be covered, qualitatively, Proposition 4 is unaltered. The unrestricted collusive price (and hence the associated unrestricted pro…t) exceeds the restricted collusive price (and hence the associated restricted pro…t) only for a "narrow" range of the advertising cost, a. For the most part, the restricted pro…ts are higher! More importantly, in terms of comparisons with pro…ts under semicollusion on advertising, ac ; allowing for some prices that lead to less than full coverage is of no consequence. For reasonable parameter values, pc and ac intersect, with ac intersecting pc from below -which establishes the result.
The main …ndings thus far are that (i) collusion on advertising and competition on price is more pro…table than competition on both price and advertising and (ii) collusion on price does not always lead to higher pro…ts compared to collusion on advertising. Empirical evidence seem to support both our …ndings. As stated in the introduction, studies of price and advertising strategies …nd support for collusion on advertising but not price, which is supportive of my …ndings 18 .
6 Is Semicollusion Disadvantageous?
Fershtman and Gandal (1994) argue that semicollusion typically induces intense competition on the choice variable(s) chosen noncooperatively. If the competitive pressure is su¢ ciently intense, semicollusion results in lower pro…ts compared to the fully noncooperative outcome. Does this thesis hold in our framework?
To answer this question, I compare the noncooperative pro…ts to the collusive pro…ts. Speci…cally, I compare nc and ac on the one hand and nc and pc on the other. I …nd that;
Proposition 5 Semicollusion (price/advertising) yields higher equilibrium pro…ts than when …rms compete in both price and advertising.
Proof. See Appendix A. Proposition 5 supports the conventional wisdom that, overall, …rms are better o¤ colluding rather than competing. A question that arises is: Why is semicollusion disadvantageous in the models of Fershtman and Gandal (1994) , but not in the present model? In Fershtman and Gandal (1994) , when …rms collude on price, they overinvest in capacity hoping to use the excess capacity as a bargaining chip in the division of the collusive pro…ts. However, in equilibrium, excess capacity is totally redundant. 19 ;20 Since capacity is costly to install, price collusion may hurt …rms compared to fully noncooperative interaction. Unlike capacity, advertising has a positive direct e¤ect for the advertising …rm -it raises demand. In fact, the reason for "excessive" advertising (under price collusion) is to increase demand. Thus, even though advertising (just like capacity) is costly, it is not totally redundant. This demand expansion e¤ect mitigates the negative e¤ect of higher advertising intensities. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that …rms advertise excessively under price collusion, they still earn higher pro…ts compared to competition on both price and advertising.
Conclusion
I analyze …rms'incentives to collude on advertising when advertising is purely informative. I …nd that semicollusion on advertising is more pro…table than competition on both price and advertising. From a welfare perspective, collusion on advertising is bad. When …rms collude on advertising, "too few" consumers are informed and, as a result, welfare is lower than when …rms compete on both prices and advertising. This result is important for policy. Although advertising is only informative, there is need for monitoring -more so with the advent of advertising agencies. Left unchecked, …rms will be tempted to connive against consumers.
I also compare price collusion to collusion on advertising. In general, price collusion does not dominate collusion on advertising. In this sense, there is no justi…cation for the theoretical literature's exclusive focus on price collusion. Hence I lend theoretical support to the empirical literature that largely …nd evidence of collusion on advertising rather than on price.
In this paper, I use a static model to study …rms' incentives to collude on advertising. But, will the …rms actually collude on advertising? To answer this question, we need a dynamic/ repeated setting which permits …rms to respond to the actions of competitors. Collusion on advertising is sustainable only if the incentives to deviate are outweighed by the bene…ts from conforming. This, however, is left for future research.
< 08a: I conclude that nc > ac ; for all a 2 t=2;
Proof of Proposition 2 Proof. Let W ac (CS ac ) be the welfare (consumer surplus) when …rms collude on advertising but compete on prices and W nc (CS nc ) be the welfare (consumer surplus) when …rms compete on both prices and advertising. Because the market is covered, CS = v p: De…ning welfare as pro…ts plus consumer surplus (W = + CS), I get that
Subtracting the latter from the former gives : Substituting a = (v 2t)(v t) 2t
; I get;
. It follows therefore that pc (a) > ac (a). 
Hence the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Whenever b a exists, the result follows directly from Lemma 3. Hence I only need to show that b a indeed exists 8 2 ; 1 3 ; for some > 0: 21 Notice that for any given ; a is constrained to the interval (a ( ) ; a ( )), where a ( ) = 2 v and a ( ) =
( 1 2 
. To begin with, notice that
: Notice also that
v > 0 for 2 (0; 0:365 ) : Since for our purposes < 1=3; Hence, pc (a) and ac (a) intersect.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. 2 1 The restriction that < 1=3 is a direct consequence of the full market coverage assumption. Under low di¤erentiation, t < v=2; which implies < 1=2: However, internal consistencies (within the model) impute further restrictions on : Because a = That is, when t is small, the restricted collusive price is close to the unrestricted price. This shows that the full coverage assumption does not constrain the collusive price "too much".
I next derive the …rms'optimal pro…ts. The objective is to show that the unrestricted pro…ts do not di¤er much from the "restricted" pro…ts. As we saw above, for a a ; the collusive price is given by p where is given by (B6). Observe that for a 2 (v=2; a ) ; the market is not covered. That is, We see that when t is small, the range of a over which pc ur is relevant is very "narrow" and moreover, this range diminishes as t converges to zero. Hence, when t is small, pc ur is largely irrelevant and pc pc r : That is, when t is small, assuming full coverage is not very restrictive.
For a > a 2 ; the advertising levels are low, but the equilibrium price when …rms compete for the fully informed consumers is high ( @p @a > 0). Thus, although fewer consumers receive advertising from both …rms, the price applicable to this group is not very di¤erent from the monopoly price. As a result, it pays to compete for the fully informed consumers. Hence, for a > a 2 ; …rms …nd it pro…table to compete for the fully informed consumers.
To summarize (see Figure 2 . above), a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists for a 2 (t=2; a 1 ) and for a > a 2 : For a 2 (a 1 ; a 2 ) ; a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Firms have incentives to defect from the symmetric equilibrium when a 2 (a 1 ; a 2 ) :
it charges price p = v t for the advertised good while the other …rm, …rm j; charges price v 2t. This price, v 2t; ensures that the fully informed consumer who travels the farthest distance (unit interval) is just indi¤erent between buying from …rm i at price v t and buying from …rm j:
